Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BANGKO 00224 070655Z

2.1

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-05 EB-07 IGA-01 AGR-05 PM-03 NSC-05

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9563

SECRETBANGKOK 0224

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM USSAG/7AF NAKHON PHANOM APRT TH/CS SENT ACTION CINCPAC HONOLULU HI INFO CHMEDTC PHNOM PENH, AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH, AMEMBASSY BANGKOK, COMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK, CDR MACTHAI SPT GP CP SAMAE SAN, JCS WASHDC, CINCPACAF HICKHAM AFB HI 23 DEC 75 DTG 231023Z DEC 74 REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO QUOTE

S E C R E T NOFORN

CINCPAC FOR J46, J4. JCS FOR J4.

SUBJ: TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES - RICE AIRDROP TO CAMBODIAN ENCLAVES (\mathbf{U})

REF: A. AMEMB BKK 061100Z DEC 74 (NOTAL: JCS, CINCPACAF) (C)

- B. CINCPAC MSG 100007Z DEC 74 (C)
- C. USSAG/7AF/LG MSG 100827Z DEC 74 (NOTAL EXCEPT MEDTC) (U)
- D. CHMEDTC MSG 161048Z DEC 74 (NOTAL EXCEPT USSAG, AMEMB

BKK) (C)

- 1. (C) REF A REQUESTED ALTERNATE STORAGE AND RIGGING SITE FOR CAMBODIAA DESTINED RICE FOR AIRDROP BY U.S. C-130 AIRCRAFT VICE U-TAPAO AFLD.
- $2.~({\rm C})$ REF B REQUESTED USSAG/7AF ANALYSIS OF BATTAMBANG OR POCHENTONG AFLD CAMBODIA AS ALTERNATIVE SITE.
- 3. (U) REF C REQUESTED MEDTC COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES.
- 4. (C) REF D PROVIDED CHMEDTC COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS QUOTED IN PART FOR YOUR REVIEW.
- QUOTE A. RIGGING OPERATIONS INVOLVING U.S. C-130 OR KAF C-123 SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BANGKO 00224 070655Z

AIRCRAFT AT BATTAMBANG AIRFIELD CANNOT PRESENTLY BE SUPPORTED.

IN REGARD TO THE C-130 OPERATIONS AT BATTAMBANG, U.S.RIGGERS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RIG, CONDUCT JOINT AIRCRAFT INSPECTIONS, AND TRAIN FANK PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOW ONLY QUALIFIED FOR RIGGING C-123 AIRCRAFT (HEAD SPACE FOR U.S. RIGGERS WOULD BE VERY LIMITED IN NUMBERS AND TIME). FURTHERMORE, FACILITIES AND MAT-ERIAL SIMILIAR TO THAT PRESENTLY REQUIRED AT SAMAE SAN/U-TAPAO TO SUPPORT THE RICE AIRDROP OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED AT BATTAMBANG IN ORDER TO INITIATE AND SUSTAIN AN OPERATION AT THAT LOCATION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT WHILE LOADING, THE C-130 AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SPEND APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES ON THE GROUND. SINCE THE AIRFIELD AT BATTAMBANG MAY BE SUBJECT TO INTERDICTION, IT MIGHT THEREFORE NOT ALWAYS BE USEABLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF C-130 OPERATIONS. CONCERNING THE KAF C-123 SORTIES, A MISSION OF 190 TONS OF RICE WOULD REQUIRE 32 SORTIES FROM BATTAMBANG PLUS 17 TO 18 POSITIONAL SORTIES (THERE ARE CURRENTLY ABOUT 15 PRODUCTIVE C-123 LOADS PER MONTH TO BATTAMBANG). DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, KAF HAS ALLOCATED 35 AMMO AIRDROP SORTIES PER MONTH. ELIMINATION OF ALL KAF AMMO AIRDROP SORTIES MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF A NEED FOR SHORT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OR URGENTLY NEEDED SMALL QUANTITIES NOT NORMALLY CARRIED BY C-130'S OR MUNITIONS OF DODIC NOT AVAILABLE AT U-TAPAO. IF C-130 AIRCRAFT ASSUMED THE AIR DELIVERY A COMPLETE REVISION OF CDS AIRCRAFT CONFIGU-RATION WOULD BE REQUIRED. CURRENTLY THE C-130'S ARE USING A STANDARD CDS CONFIGUATION USING ONLY THOSE TYPES OF MUNITIONS THAT ARE IN HIGH DEMEND. SOME ENCLAVES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO ABSORB FULL C-130 LOADS AND SPLITTING C-130 LOADS INTRODUCES ADDITIONAL TARGET BUNDLES, ON-STANDARD PALLET LOADING AND GATE CONFIGU-RATION WHICH MAY BE UNECONOMICAL AND UNMANAGEABLE. THEREFORE, IT IS REALISTIC TO PLAN AT LEAST A MINIMUM OF 15 C-123 AIRDROPS PER MONTH TO COVER MEDICINE. CONTINGENCY AND MISCELLANEOUS EMERGENCY COMPENSATING AIRDROPS. THE TOTAL UNPRODUCTIVE POSITIONAL, RICE AND COMPENSATING AIRDROPS ARE ESTIMATED TO REQUIRE 64 SORTIES AS OPPOSED TO CURRENT 35. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT C-123 ASSETS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT UNTIL APRIL WHEN THE FIRST INCREASED INCREMENT OF KAF SELF-SUFFIEIENCY PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE AN INCREASED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY (3 ADDITIONAL PLANES). B. SEE PARAGRAPH A ABOVE IN REFERENCE TO DIVERTING KAF C-123

B. SEE PARAGRAPH A ABOVE IN REFERENCE TO DIVERTING KAF C-123
PRIORITIES AT POCHENTONG FROM AMMO TO RICE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BANGKO 00224 070655Z

C. A C-130 RIGGING SITE AT POCHENTONG IS NOT FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME DUE TO SPACE LIMITATIONS, LACK OF MHE, AND UNTRAINED PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT A C-130 OPERATION. UNQUOTE.

5. (SNF) THREAT ASSESSMENT:

A. (C) ANTI-AIRCRAFT THREAT WITHIN A 15 KM RADIUS OF BATTAMBANG AND POCHENTONG:

(1) THE FOLLOWING ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS MAY BE ENCOUNTERED: CALIBER/TYPE EFFECTIVE RANGE

14.5 HEAVY MACHINE GUN 4,593 FT 12.7 HEAVY MACHINE GUN 3.281 FT

(2) INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS EFFECTIVE UP TO 3,200

FEET MAY ALSO BE USED IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROLE.

- B. (SNF) GROUND THREAT TO BATTAMBANG AIRFIELD:
- (1) ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF BATTAMBANG

HAS CONSISTED OF SPORADIC GROUND ATTACKS AND ABF'S AGAINST FANK

POSITIONS AND POPULAR FORCE UNITS DEFENDING GKR VILLAGES.

OCCASIONAL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO INTERDICT ROUTE 5 BETWEEN BATTAMBANG AND MUONG RUSSEI.

- (2) USSAG/IN CURRENTLY HOLD APPROX FOUR BNS
- (1000-1200 TROOPS) WITHIN 25 KM OF BATTAMBANG. THESE TROOPS ARE

PROBABLY ARMED WITH 82MM AND 60MM MORTARS, 12.7MM MACHINE GUNS,

B-40/B-41 ROCKET LAUNCHES, AND INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. THERE IS NO

EVIDENCE AT PRESENT TO INDICATE THESE UNITS ARE ARMED WITH 107MM

OR 122MM ROCKETS. HOWEVER, THE KC EMPLOY BOTH TYPES OF ROCKETS

IN OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FORCES

IN THE BATTAMBANG AREA COULD BE SUPPLIED WITH THESE ITEMS.

ALTHOUGH NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE INDICATING THAT THESE UNITS ARE ARMED WITH ANY TYPE OF RECOILLESS RIFLE. IT IS POSSI-

BLE THAT THEY ARE ARMED WITH A MINIMAL NUMBER OF 57MM OR 75MM RRS.

- C. (SNF) GROUND THREAT TO POCHENTONG AIRFIELD:
- (1) ENEMY TROOPS ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONDUCTING

OPERATIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY (15KM) OF POCHENTONG. THE

MOST RECENT ABF DIRECTED AGAINST POCHENTONG WAS A 13 OCT SEVEN

ROUND 107MM ROCKET ATTACK CONDUCTED DURING THE HOURS OF DARK-

NESS. NO DAMAGE TO AIRFIELD FACILITIES RESULTED. THE AIRFIELD

IS A STATED OBJECTIVE FOR THE KC DRY SEASON CAMPAIGN. OTHER 107MM $\,$

RKT FIRINGS, SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN AIMED AT POCHENTONG

WERE REPORTED ON 25 AND 29 OCT.

- (2) USSAG/IN CURRENTLY HOLDS APPROX TEN BNS (APPROX
- 2,500-3,000 TROOPS) WITHIN 20 KMS OF THE AIRFIELD. THESE FORCES

PROBABLY POSSESS 105MM HOWITZERS, 122MM AND 107MM RKTS,

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PAGE 04 BANGKO 00224 070655Z

 $120 MM/82 MM/60 MM\ MORTARS, 57 MM\ AND\ 75 MM\ RRS, 12.7 MM\ MACHINE\ GUNS,$

 $\mbox{\sc B-40/B-41}$ RKT LAUNCHERS, AND INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS.

D. (C) THREAT TO A SUSTAINED USAF C-130 BASE OF OPERATION

AT POCHENTONG WOULD BE MODERATE TO HIGH: THREAT TO SIMILAR

OPERATIONS AT BATTAMBANG WOULD BE LOW TO MODERATE.

6. (C) THREE ADDITIONAL FACTORS HAVE TRANSPIRED SINCE REF A THAT

COULD AFFECT THE TRANSSHIPMENT PROBLEM SUBSTANTIALLY:

A. THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING BATTAMBANG RICE TO THAILAND BY

SURFACE (TRUCK) IS CURRENTLY BEING EXPLORED. SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIA-

TION OF THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD ALLEVIATE THE TRANSSHIPMENT PROBLEM

B. DUE TO THE STRINGENT FUNDING IN CAMBODIA, KAF SELF-

SUFFICIENCY MAY NOT MATERIALIZE AND EVEN GREATER RELIANCE WILL

BE PLACED ON U.S. AIRDROPS FROM U-TAPAO. THIS ALTERNATIVE PLACES

EVEN MORE EMPHASIS ON RESOLUTION OF THE TRANSSHIPMENT PROBLEM.

C. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT IN CONSIDERING THE USE OF POCHENTONG IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MEKONG LOC INTO POCHENTONG OR THE USE OF POCHENTONG ITSELF COULD BE INTERDICTED. THIS HEADQUARTERS IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION MEANS IF THIS SHOULD HAPPEN AND WILL FORWARD THE STUDY TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS UPON COMPLETION, IN APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS. GDS 31 DEC 82. UNQUOTE. KINTNER

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